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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/ACV, IO/S,  
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)  
NSC FOR SMITH  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE  
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 7, 2007

This is CWC-92-07.

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REVCON WORKING GROUP  
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¶1. (U) On December 4, UK Ambassador Lyn Parker chaired a meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on Preparations for the Second Review Conference to discuss initial reactions to the recently distributed &Note by the Technical Secretariat: Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention since the First Review Conference<sup>8</sup> (WGRC-2/S/1). Director General Pfirter introduced the paper by reviewing its general outline, and highlighting challenges that lie ahead in several key areas: complete destruction of chemical weapons by the 2012 deadline; the future shift in the Organization's focus from disarmament to non-proliferation; encouraging States Parties with significant chemical industries to fulfill their Article VII obligations; and working toward universal implementation of the Convention.

¶2. (U) Amb. Parker suggested that future discussions on the paper might be organized by the major headings used in the paper itself. He added that it will be important for him to develop a sense of how many of the policy issues raised within could realistically be addressed at the RevCon itself, and which might be better treated by simply laying out a path for future work.

¶3. (U) A surprising number of delegations had fairly detailed comments, in all cases caveated as preliminary. Most delegations offered support for consideration of the future shift in the OPCW's focus, with Japan noting its view that with the shift in focus, the Organization will also need to undergo a structural adjustment. Many also noted the importance of resolving the site selection methodology for OCPFs and the possibility of refining declarations for these facilities. It was also encouraging to hear a number of delegations (mainly WEOG) state up front that they agree that 2008 will be too early to establish or even discuss possible courses of action for the U.S. (and perhaps Russia) in 2012. Canada also noted that the possibility still exists that other states possessing chemical weapons may come into the treaty at a later date, which will also necessitate

consideration of post-2012 destruction.

¶4. (U) A number of other specific comments were provided. Australia and France both raised the importance of exploring and enhancing the OPCW's role in the global fight against terrorism. Australia, Canada and the Netherlands recommended that the topic of Schedule 2A/2A asterisk be taken up again as an urgent matter. Australia, later echoed by Italy, also expressed concern that a ban on Schedule 3 transfers to States Not Party might be detrimental for efforts to achieve universality, and that it could even encourage the growth of unregulated indigenous production in the states that remain outside the Convention. France and Germany said they were not fully convinced of the utility of sampling and analysis during Schedule 2 inspections and, as such, stressed the importance of a TS report on their experience during the trial period. Germany and China both expressed some concern over the use of open source information for verification activities.

¶5. (U) Germany made a lengthy intervention in which it highlighted its disagreement with the concept that industry and destruction verification are or should be treated in a similar manner, noting its view that the industry verification regime was intended to be more of a confidence building measure. Germany also recommended that the industry issues be considered as a package; on OCPF inspections, for instance, a simple increase in the number of inspections is not the solution. The German delegation noted its view that in Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and analysis, the possibility to use the blinded mode of the software should absolutely be retained.

¶6. (U) India also made an intervention that focused almost entirely on stressing the importance of completion of

chemical weapons destruction as the top priority for the Organization. In fairly stark contrast to other statements indicating the RevCon should not be consumed with the issue of 2012, the Indian Ambassador stated that without the luxury of knowing when destruction will be complete, the Organization cannot afford to focus on other issues. India also made token references to the hierarchy of risk in industry inspections and the possibilities of assistance to states with growing chemical industries.

¶7. (U) Also noteworthy were the delegations who did not comment; Iran, Cuba and Russia were conspicuously silent. The Director General closed with remarks that the paper was intended to provide a full spectrum of issues as food for thought for the States Parties to decide the RevCon priorities. The Chair noted that the Work Plan for the Working Group has been updated, and that an updated outline of the draft report will be circulated prior to the next meeting of the group on December 12. A note summarizing discussions so far and papers submitted (national, academic, NGO) will also be issued soon, primarily for the benefit of States Parties that do not attend the Working Group meetings.

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WEOG DISCUSSIONS  
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¶8. (U) The WEOG meeting on December 4 reviewed the results of EC-51, briefly discussed the report of the EC visit to Anniston, and discussed the RevCon Working Group meeting immediately following. Under EC-51, Germany noted that a way ahead has yet to be established for the approval of Russia's Maradykovsky Facility Agreement and Verification Plan.

¶9. (U) On the visit report, there was widespread agreement that the report should not be subjected to further negotiation, although Germany noted its expectation that some capitals (read: Berlin) may have comments or further questions for the visited State Party. When the U.S. suggested that the writing of the report might be improved by accomplishing as much drafting as possible in country (with memories still fresh, and without the inappropriate

involvement of capitals), WEOG Chair and representative on the Anniston visit Annie Mari stated this would give the visited State Party &too much influence.<sup>8</sup>

¶10. (U) In the context of the RevCon Working Group, the Chair raised the topic of the recent NGO meeting, and the growing number of references to &non-lethals.<sup>8</sup> U.S. Rep noted the importance in future discussions of adhering strictly to Convention terminology, and avoiding the inappropriate combination of issues (e.g. &incapacitants<sup>8</sup> and riot control agents) that are clearly intended by the CWC to be treated separately. The UK delegation also made a pitch for delegations to make substantive interventions at the upcoming meeting, and also to agree where possible with the DG,s introduction to the TS paper, which the Chair would apparently take as tacit approval to incorporate much of the text (or at least general concepts) in the draft outline report.

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REVCON CHAIR UPDATE  
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¶11. (SBU) Japanese delegate told del reps that Pakistan, as chair of the Asia regional group, had formally circulated the candidacy of the Saudi Ambassador for the chair of the Review Conference. With rumors of Indian interest in the chair, it may well have been a pre-emptive move by Pakistan to prevent India,s coming forward. The Asia Group has not yet scheduled a meeting, but it will likely be in January.

¶12. (U) BEIK SENDS.  
Arnall